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Tax competition within the EU is ﬁercer than in the rest of the OECD with tax rates falling 
rapidly. This paper analyzes tax responses of EU-15 countries to corporate tax changes in the 
EU-10 new member states as a function of their proximity to these new member states. The 
average corporate tax rate in the new member states has always been considerably lower than the 
average in the EU-15 countries. Their entry into the EU eliminated capital barriers, allowing 
ﬁrms to locate in one of the new EU-10 with full access to the European Market. Our results 
indicate that EU-15 countries geographically closer to the new member states respond stronger to 
corporate tax changes in these new member states. We use a theoretical and a spatial regression 
framework  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  distance  to  a  low  tax  region  intensiﬁes  countries’  tax 
reaction functions. 
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Tax competition within the EU is ¯ercer than in the rest of the OECD with nominal tax
rates falling rapidly. This is illustrated in Figure 1. From the mid-nineties onwards, tax
rates throughout the OECD countries started to slide. But where this process halted for
non-EU OECD countries with average tax rates stabilizing after the year 2004, tax rates
in Europe continued to fall. The entry of the new member states (NMS2) in 2004 with
much lower tax rates than the rest of Europe, did not trigger tax competition, but Figure 1
shows that it seems to have intensi¯ed the already existing tax competition in Europe. The
average tax rate in the EU153 decreased from 38.57% in 1993 to 28.64% in 2007.
Source: European Commission
Note: OECD-7 non EU-countries= Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, US, Korea, Mexico
Figure 1: Evolution of corporate tax rates in OECD and EU, 1995-2006
2NMS= Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Cyprus and
Malta
3EU-15= Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Austria
2In fact, casual empiricism suggests that former EU-15 countries geographically close to
the NMS such as Germany and Italy experienced tax rates falling faster than those in
EU-15 countries further away from the former Central-European countries. This can be
seen from Figure 2 where we divide the former EU-15 countries into two separate groups
(Figure A in appendix A visualizes which countries have been included in each group).
We show average tax rates for "neighboring" countries i.e. countries of the former EU-
15 that share a land or water border with any of the countries of former Central-Europe
(Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece). Next, we also show the
evolution of the average tax rate of the "non-neighboring" EU countries (Spain, France,
UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal). It can be noted that the
average nominal tax rate of "neighbors" fell more sharply than that of "non-neighbors"
where changes were less drastic over time. In this comparison we excluded Ireland which
seems to behave very di®erently from the rest of the EU-15 with tax rates falling even below
those of the NMS as early as 19994. Despite the fact that we classify "neighbors" and
"non-neighbors" somewhat arbitrarily, tax reforms seem to have evolved distinctly di®erent
across these two sets of countries.
To understand the di®erent tax behavior of "neighbor" and "non-neighbor" countries, the
purpose of this paper is to analyze how "distance to a low tax region" like the NMS a®ects
countries' tax reaction functions. Could it be that countries close to a low tax region are
subject to more intense tax competition than others? Using a spatial reaction function ap-
proach, we provide evidence con¯rming the existence of tax competition in Europe. But the
evidence suggests that tax reaction functions in Europe are asymmetric. EU-15 "neighbors"
of the NMS appear to respond much stronger to taxes set by the new member states than
other EU-15 countries. Our ¯ndings suggest that German tax rates respond much stronger
to taxes set in the NMS than France's tax rates.
For instance, in section 3 of this paper we develop a simple theoretical model that o®ers an
explanation for why Germany rather than France is more subject to tax competition from
the NMS. Our analysis shows that "geography" matters. In our model, countries have a
4We will treat Ireland as an outlier which will initially be dropped from the analysis but will be included
in the robustness section.
3Figure 2: Tax Rate of the neighbors versus non-neighbors of the new member states
Neighbors: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece; Non-neighbors: Spain,
France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal
The STR is not weighed. Source: Vandenbussche and Crabb¶ e (2006), extra data included for 2005 and
2006.
¯xed geographical position but footloose ¯rms can move freely between them. It will become
clear that countries closer to a low tax region are more subject to tax competition and will
set a lower tax rate than more remote countries. An intuitive way to think about this is to
make the comparison with the product space. In a Hotelling type of model with transport
costs it is a well known result that when ¯rms locate geographically further apart, price-
competition is less ¯erce and ¯rms are less a®ected by price cuts of rival ¯rms. Similarly,
this paper ¯nds that tax premia are higher the further away a country is from a low tax
region. Or put di®erently, we ¯nd asymmetric tax response of countries in the EU-15 to
the low taxes in the NMS. Germany, while strongly a®ected by the tax rates set in say
Poland, does not seem to be signi¯cantly a®ected by the tax rates set by France. Hence, tax
competition in Germany seems predominantly to come from countries located to its right
and not to its left.
We are not the ¯rst to look at spatial reaction issues. Earlier studies have looked at tax rates
interdependence in the EU-15 or in the OECD such as Devereux et al. (2008), Altshuler
and Goodspeed (2002), Redoano (2003), Ruiz and Gerard (2007) and Davies and Voget
4(2008). The results we obtain in this paper shed additional light on earlier ¯ndings. We
con¯rm the weak tax interdependency amongst the countries of 'old Europe' reported earlier.
But in contrast to earlier studies, we include the new member states and ¯nd evidence of
asymmetric ¯scal responses between European countries which seems to be determined by
the geographical distance to the low tax countries in the new member states. In our analysis,
we consider Ireland to be an outlier in the EU-14 in terms of tax competition in view of the
fact that its tax rate shows a very di®erent pattern relative to other EU countries as shown
in Figure 2.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss related literature and previous
¯ndings. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical model for the purpose of guiding the
empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology and the data. Section 5
reports the results and the ¯nal section concludes.
2. Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Functions
Devereux et al. (2008)5 analyze strategic tax competition in 21 OECD countries in the
period 1982-1999. They ¯nd that countries strategically compete over the statutory tax
rate and e®ective tax rate6 and that countries with relatively high e®ective tax rates react
more strongly to tax rates in other countries. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) are the ¯rst
to study tax competition in EU-15 countries. Their ¯ndings suggest that EU-15 countries
react to the corporate tax7 of geographically close countries, but do not react to the personal
income tax of geographic neighbors. They ¯nd that ever since the US tax reform of 1986,
European countries compete to a lesser extent with the US on corporate tax rates. Redoano
(2003) also studies tax reaction functions between EU countries. Using statutory tax rates
for 13 EU countries during the period 1980-1995, she ¯nds that tax competition mainly
occurs between countries that are geographically close. Ruiz and Gerard (2007) provide
empirical evidence of weak tax reactions between neighboring EU-15 countries for statutory
5See Brueckner (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) for an overview of the ¯scal reaction literature.
6e®ective tax rate calculated using the forward looking method, see Devereux et al. (2002).
7Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) use the corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP as corporate
tax measure and the personal income revenue as a percentage of GDP as personal income tax measure.
5and e®ective tax rates during the period 1989-2001. Finally, Davies and Voget (2008)
investigate whether the expansion of the European Union intensi¯ed tax competition since
EU-countries have a larger market potential (domestic market combined with access to
foreign markets). There results indicate that non-EU members respond equally to other
countries regardless of membership, while EU members respond more to other EU-members
tax rates. The authors use the average e®ective tax rate as a measure of taxes and do not
distinguish among EU-members.
This paper is the ¯rst to include the EU's new member states. We ¯nd empirical evidence of
asymmetric ¯scal responses between EU-14 countries determined mainly by the geographical
distance of each country to the low tax countries in the new member states.
3. The model
In this section we develop a simple theoretical model that can explain some of the stylized
facts outlined in the introduction. The set up is similar to Hau°er and Wooton (1999)
but additionally introduces spatial 'distance' into the model. The assumptions are carefully
chosen in order to keep the model as tractable as possible. We assume that a foreign, say
U.S., multinational (MNE) intends to invest in Europe. It has the choice of locating in one
of two countries: country A (EU-15) or country B (NMS)8. Where we assume country A
to be the larger market of the two. This assumption arguably re°ects the current situation
in the enlarged EU market. If the MNE decides to set up in one country, it will face a
transport cost (c) when exporting to the other country, while there are no transport costs
to distribute the good within a country. Marginal production costs9 and ¯xed costs are
assumed to be equal in both countries and are dropped from the analysis. The staging of
events is as follows:
1. Countries A and B set their tax rates (tA;tB) simultaneously in order to maximize
their welfare.
8For simplicity we reduce enlarged Europe into two separate countries, but they can also be thought of
as two individual countries each belonging to one of the two countries EU-15 or NMS.
9It is true that wage costs in Central Europe are lower but studies have shown that productivity is also
lower which to a large extent o®sets their wage advantage. Therefore for simplicity we assume that these
costs cancel out and that marginal production costs are equal.
62. The multinational chooses to locate in A or B, taking into account the tax rates and
transportation cost.
3. The multinational decides on local output and exports to the other country to maxi-
mize after-tax pro¯ts.
The model can be solved through backwards induction. In stage 3, the multinational decides
on output and exports to maximize its after-tax pro¯ts. We assume the inverse demand
functions of country A and B to be respectively, PA = (M ¡ QA) and PB = (m ¡ QB),
where the market size M is substantially larger than the market m. The after-tax pro¯t
(¼A) of the multinational when choosing to locate in A is:
¼A = ((M ¡ QA)QA + (m ¡ QAB)QAB ¡ cxQAB)(1 ¡ tA) (1)
The ¯rst term represents the sales in country A, the second term is the sales in country B
and the third term is the transport cost (c) of shipping the exported quantity (QAB) over a
distance x which is the distance between country A and B. And tA is the corporate tax rate
in country A. The expression for the after-tax pro¯t of the multinational when locating in
B is:
¼B = [(m ¡ QB)QB + (M ¡ QBA)QBA ¡ cxQBA](1 ¡ tB) (2)
Maximizing these after-tax pro¯ts and using the equilibrium outputs10 in (1) and (2), leads
us to the equilibrium after-tax pro¯ts of the multinational in country A or B, respectively:
¼¤
A =
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2
4
(1 ¡ tA) (3)
¼¤
B =
m2 + (M ¡ cx)2
4
(1 ¡ tB) (4)
We start by deriving the 'indi®erence tax rate'. The multinational will be indi®erent between
locating in country A or B when its after-tax pro¯ts in country A equals its after-tax pro¯t






2cx(M ¡ m) + tB(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2 (5)
10The equilibrium outputs are derived in Appendix B.1, in order for the outputs to be positive, the
following conditions must be true: M>cx and m>cx.




2cx(m ¡ M) + tA(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)
(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
(6)
The expression above already indicates that the indi®erence tax reaction function of country
A is a function of the transport cost c between A and B, the distance x between the two
countries, the tax rate tB of the other country B and the market size of both countries M
and m. This indi®erence reaction function has some features that can explain the observed
stylized facts. For instance, it can be noted that the tax rates of country A and B are
strategic complements since tB enters the indi®erence reaction function of tA with a positive
sign and vice versa.
Proposition 1. Tax rates between countries are strategic complements.
This implies that a decrease (rise) in the tax rate of country B will be met by a decrease
(rise) in the tax rate of country A. This seems to con¯rm the facts presented in Figure
2 where all European tax rates are more or less falling together. The empirical part of
the paper will use this reaction function to analyze to what extent tax rates of the EU-15
countries are sensitive to tax changes in the NMS.
In stage 1 of the tax game, we de¯ne the welfare objective function of each country as the
sum of consumer surplus (CS) and tax income (tax on pro¯ts before tax) if the multinational
locates in that country. To simplify things, we assume that the U.S. multinational does not
reinvest its equilibrium pro¯ts in Europe, but shifts all its pro¯ts back to the US which is
why its pro¯ts are not included in a country's welfare function. Therefore each country's
welfare in the presence of the MNE can be represented as follows:





Depending on whether the MNE locates in country A or in country B, the welfare for A will






M2 + (m ¡ cx)2
4
(8)
8If the multinational decides to locate in country B (option 2) and exports to country A, the
welfare of country A is
WA2 =
M2 ¡ 6cxM + 5c2x2
8
(9)
In this case, country B acts as an FDI export platform11.
Country A will be indi®erent between being the host of the MNE versus importing the good
from country B, when the welfare in both options is equal: WA1 = WA2. This equality
determines the minimal tax rate or the maximum subsidy (~ tA) that country A is willing to
o®er in order to attract the ¯rm.




M2 + (m ¡ cx)2
4
=




2(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)
Similarly for B, the minimal tax rate or maximum subsidy ( ~ tB) that country B is willing to
o®er in order to attract the ¯rm is




m2 + (M ¡ cx)2
4
=




2(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
Since by assumption M > cx and m > cx), we know that ~ tA and ~ tB are negative. Hence,
they are both willing to o®er a subsidy to the MNE in order to attract the MNE. This
implies that having a MNE always raises welfare in both countries.
Using (11) in (5), we can derive the maximum tax rate that country A can charge while
keeping the ¯rm indi®erent between locations and given country B's best o®er.
t¤
A =
4cxM + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxm
2(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)
(12)
Since the market size in country A is larger than in B (M > m), t¤
A is positive suggesting
that A can charge a tax rate and still keep the multinational indi®erent between locations.
11A FDI export platform means that FDI is attracted to country B that is located near other valuable
markets such as country A, because country B makes a good platform for reaching country A and is usually
cheaper in location (taxes, labor costs, etc) (Bloningen et al. (2007); Ekholm et al. (2007)).
9A similar calculation for country B gives us
t¤
B =
4cxm + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxM
2(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
(13)
which is negative or in other words country B needs to subsidize the MNE to keep the MNE
indi®erent between locations. Comparing (12) and (13), we can show that the larger market
of country A implies that it can set a (positive) tax premium compared to country B (see
appendix B.3 for a proof). This result con¯rms Hau°er and Wooton (1999) and Baldwin
and Krugman (2004) who ¯nd that larger countries can set a higher tax rate.
Proposition 2. A larger country sets a higher equilibrium tax than a smaller country.
This con¯rms the stylized facts in Figure 1 where we noted that the tax rate of EU-15 is
higher than the tax rate of the NMS12. But most importantly for our purposes, a comparative
static of the tax rate of country A with respect to the distance between country A and
country B, leaving everything else constant, shows that the tax premium of country A




@x > 0, see appendix B.3). Or put
di®erently, the further country A is to the smaller country B (the smaller x), the higher the
tax premium country A can set. In terms of individual countries this implies that a country
belonging to the older EU members (EU-15) that lies further away from the NMS can set a
higher tax rate than another EU-15 country closer to a low tax NMS country. This is the
result we aim to test and that will guide our empirical analysis in the next section.
Proposition 3. The geographical distance between a country of the EU-15 and the new
member states (NMS), determines the tax premium, with a lower tax premium for countries
closer to the low tax area.
4. Methodology and Data
The theoretical framework above has shown that distance matters and that tax premia tend
to fall for countries closely located to a low tax region. Based on the theory, we conjecture
12We only consider the domestic market size, while Davies and Voget (2008) take into account the market
potential of a country which is the domestic market combined with the access to export to other markets.
10that EU countries closer to the NMS will exert a stronger tax reaction to tax changes in the
NMS than EU countries further away from the NMS. In this section, we empirically test
this hypothesis using spatial regression analysis to uncover the existence of ¯scal reaction
functions between groups of countries. This method links the tax rate of one country to
the tax rate of other countries taking into account the distance between these countries
(Besley and Case (1995); Bordignon et al. (2002); Brueckner (2003)). We start by testing
the reaction of the EU-14 countries (Ireland excluded from the EU-15 for reasons explained
in the introduction) on the tax rates of the new member states (NMS) during the period





wijTAXjNMS;t) + +¯2XiEU14;t (14)
+®iEU14 + "iEU14;t
The dependent variable TAXiEU14;t represents the vector of individual corporate tax rates of
all EU-14 countries (Ireland excluded) which are assumed to be a function of the right hand
side variables in (14) including corporate tax rates of the new member states (TAXjNMS;t)
where each of the latter is weighted by its distance to the individual EU-14 country (wij).
We further include a set of additional country control variables XiEU14;t and country-speci¯c
e®ects ®i. The country control variables XiEU14;t that we include are: the personal income
tax rates, mainly to allow for shifts in the tax burden from ¯rms to workers; the GDP
per capita, as a control for the demand for public services Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002)
and the population younger than 14 and older than 65 years, to control for the active
population and the market size. Of all the right hand side variables, the coe±cient ¯1 on
the weighted corporate tax rate of the NMS is our main variable of interest. The initial
weights are the inverse distance between the capital cities of any EU-14 country and the
countries of the NMS13. This implies that a NMS closer to a EU-14 country will have a
larger weight in the analysis. Signi¯cance of the coe±cient ¯1 implies that the tax rates of
13Distance data is collected from the CEP II database based on the 'great circle formula' which uses
latitudes and longitudes of cities and incorporates the internal distance of the country Head and Mayer
(2002).
11EU-14 countries respond to a change in the tax rates of NMS. In the robustness checks, we
will also experiment with alternative weights Bloningen et al. (2005).
A simple OLS estimation of the speci¯cation in (14) encounters some methodological prob-
lems. For one, the weighted tax rates of the NMS (
P
wijTAXjNMS;t) in (14) can be en-
dogenous. While tax rates of the NMS may a®ect tax rates in EU-14 countries, the inverse
may also hold. To address this problem, we apply an IV-approach (2SLS) often used in the
literature (Brueckner (2003); Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002); Redoano (2003); Heyndels
and Vuchelen (1998); Brett and Pinkse (2000); Carlsen et al. (2005), Egger et al. (2005),
etc.). In the ¯rst stage of this IV-approach, we regress the endogenous (
P
wijTAXjNMS;t)







wijXjNMS;t + ®2XiEU14;t + ®j + ½jt (15)
The set of instruments (XjNMS;t) we choose are similar to the literature and include the
proportion of population younger than 14 years, the proportion of population older than 65
years and GDP per capita. The instruments are weighted with the same weights as the tax
rates of the NMS. The vector XiEU14;t is the same set of control variables as in equation (14)
and ®j controls for country-speci¯c e®ects. In the second stage, equation (14) is estimated
using the ¯tted values of
P
wijTAXjNMS;t from equation (15). In this stage, we need to
control for autocorrelation in the tax rates of the EU-14 countries because of persistence in
the tax rates over time. Including a lagged dependent variable in a ¯xed e®ects model would
result in multicollinearity since ¯xed e®ects are time invariant Woolridge (2003). Therefore,
we opt for a country ¯xed e®ects model where we introduce dynamics by allowing for a ¯rst
order autocorrelation process (AR(1)) in the error term14.
5. Results
The results of the second stage estimations are reported in Table 1. The results of the ¯rst
stage IV regression are reported in Table B in appendix D. In all columns, we instrument15
14This is the 'Xtregar' command in the statistical program Stata which takes into account an AR(1)
disturbance term: eit = ½ ¤ ei;t¡1 + zit with zit independent and identically distributed.
15The instruments for
P
wijTAXjNMS;t are: wij(proportion of the population older than 14 yearsjt),
wij(proportion of the population younger than 65 yearsjt), wij(GDP per capitajt).
12the weighted tax rates in the new member states (
P
wijTAXjNMS;t) for reasons outlined
in the section above.
In column (1) we test for an EU-14 wide ¯scal reaction function with respect to the tax
rates in the new member states (NMS). The results con¯rm the theoretical proposition 1
and are suggestive of an EU-wide positive ¯scal reaction function of the EU-14 countries
with respect to the new member states (NMS). In columns (2) and (3) of Table 1, we split
up the sample into 'neighbors' and 'non-neighbors' of the NMS. In column (2) of Table 1,
we only consider the tax rates of the 'neighboring' EU-14 countries as a dependent variable.
We ¯nd the coe±cient of the NMS tax rates to be strong and signi¯cant at the 1% levelThis
indicates that a decrease in the tax rates of the NMS by 10%, will lead to a decrease of
16% in the tax rates of the 'neighboring countries'. This suggests that Germany's tax rate
is a®ected by Poland's tax rate. We also note that the coe±cient on the non-neighbors' tax
rate is not signi¯cant. This seems to suggest that the tax rate of Germany is not a®ected by
the tax rate in Poland. In column (3) where we only consider the tax rates of 'non-neighbors'
of NMS as dependent variables, the coe±cient of the tax rates of the NMS, while positive
in sign, is not signi¯cant. This suggests that low tax rates in the NMS a®ect taxes in their
neighboring countries, but not in other EU countries that are more distant. But we fail to
¯nd a signi¯cant reaction of the tax rates set by non-neighbors. This suggests that the tax
rate of a non-neighbor country like France does not seem to be a®ected by the tax rate of a
neighbor country like Germany. It becomes clear that EU-14 countries geographically closer
to the NMS (column (2)) react stronger to changes in the tax rates of NMS than EU-14
countries further away from the NMS (column (3)), which seems to con¯rm that geography
matters for the extent of tax competition as suggested in proposition 3.
Thus far, we have excluded Ireland from the analysis as Ireland appears to be an outlier
and for which we do not really have a good explanation. We could already see form Figure
2 that tax rates in Ireland dropped much faster than in any other EU-14 country. Ever
since 1999, the Irish tax rate has dropped below the level of NMS countries which is very
atypical compared to the rest of EU-14 that all have a positive tax premium compared to
the NMS. Ireland itself is a low tax region compared to the other EU-14 which is why, as
an experiment, in column (4) of Table 1 we include Ireland in the group of NMS countries.
13When including Ireland in the group of NMS, the coe±cient on the ¯scal reaction function
is much smaller and not signi¯cant suggesting that the tax regime in Ireland does not a®ect
continental countries.
Table 2 reports some robustness checks. In column (1), we use a di®erent set of instruments
for
P
wijTAXjNMS;t. Since it can be argued that tax setting is part of the institutional
framework of a country, we instrument
P
wijTAXjNMS;t by a set of institutional vari-
ables16. The estimates in column (1) show that the ¯scal reaction function is still positive
and signi¯cant. This indicates that the result is robust to an alternative set of instruments.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) in Table 2 are robustness checks using alternative weights wij for
the NMS' tax rates. In column (2) we weigh the tax rates of the NMS using a dummy
equal to 1 if the NMS have a common land or water border with the EU-14 country and 0
otherwise. The result is positive and signi¯cant, indicating that the tax rates of the EU-14
countries adjacent to the NMS are signi¯cantly in°uenced by the tax rates of the NMS.
This con¯rms our earlier ¯ndings where we used a continuous distance measure between
countries as weights.
In column (3) the tax rates of the NMS are weighted using export shares. These export
shares are de¯ned as the exports from the EU-14 country (i) to a country of the NMS (j)
as a share in the total export of the EU-14 country (i). The ¯scal reaction function of
export partners is not signi¯cant. In column (4) we construct a weight for similar economic
characteristics17. A higher weight wij indicates that EU-14 country i has a similar economic
development than country j of the NMS. In other words, we analyze whether countries such
as Spain and Portugal react stronger to tax rates of the NMS than other EU-14 countries
because their economic development is more similar to the NMS. The result shows that EU-
14 countries with similar economic characteristics as the NMS do not react to tax changes in
the NMS. Overall, the results of Table 2 re°ect the lower importance of trading relationships
and economic similarity. Geographical distance of an EU country to the NMS seems to be
16wjt is replaced by indices of price liberalization, privatization and enterprise reforms. These institutional
variables are collected from the EBRD reports. The ¯rst stage regression with these set of instruments is
reported in Table C in Appendix D, Table C.
17In column (4): wij= 1
GDPi¡GDPj P
(GDPi¡GDPj)
14Table 1: Estimation Results
dep var.=taxi (1) (2) (3) (4)
EU-14 only neighbors only non-neighbors EU-14, Ireland
WTaxNMS;t 0.57* 1.68*** 0.45 -0.001
(0.32) (0.65) (0.32) (0.001)
WTaxnon¡neighbors;t - -0.98 - -
(0.89)
WTaxneighbors;t - - 0.24 -
(1.9)
Income taxt¡1 0.2 0.64 0.38 0.3
(0.21) (0.54) (0.24) (0.26)
population>14 0.63 -1.29 0.16 3.21*
(1.95) (2.64) (2.34) (1.7)
population<65 -2.1 -5.96*** 0.33 -1.7
(1.38) (2.12) (1.51) (1.42)
gdp per capita -0.0001 0.002* -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
constant 33.48*** 59.98 13.22 3.88
(10.33) (24.48) (21.55) (9.44)
Observations 126 56 63 126
R-squared (within) 0.12 0.33 0.34 0.09
Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments used for WTaxNMS;t: the proportion of the
population older than 14 years, proportion of the population younger than 65 years, GDP per capita
and the lagged income tax rate of the NMS. These instruments are also weighted with the distance.
note:***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
much more important in determining a country's tax reaction function. Conversely, Davies
and Voget (2008) use a broader weight based on market potential and they do ¯nd EU-
countries to respond on tax rates of other EU-members with more market potential. From
our analysis it can be noted that EU-14 countries close to the low tax countries of the NMS
face much stronger tax competition than other EU-14 countries.
15Table 2: Robustness Checks
dep var.=taxEU¡14i (1) (2) (3) (4)
W=border dummy W=exportshare W= gdp per capita
WTaxNMS;t 0.25** 0.45* 0.05 0.34
(0.13) (0.27) (0.17) (0.24)
Income taxi;t¡1 0.24 0.19 0.16 -0.004
(0.2) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24)
14<population>65 4.41*** - - -
(1.26)
population>14 - 0.18 2.5 0.81
(1.92) (1.61) (1.94)
population<65 - -3.39*** -1.82 -1.78
(1.47) (1.31) (1.27)
gdp per capita -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
income taxt¡1 0.24 0.19 0.16 -0.004
(0.2) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24)
constant -246.92*** 67.9*** 14.34* 33.95***
(24.54) (13.85) (8.11) (8.64)
Observations 140 114 140 140
R-squared (within) 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses. In column (1), WTaxNMS;t is instrumented with institutional
variables such as an index of trade liberalization, privatization and enterprise reforms. In columns
(2), (3) and (4) the following instruments are used: the proportion of the population older than 14
years, proportion of the population younger than 65 years, GDP per capita and the lagged income
tax rate of the NMS. These instruments are also weighted with the distance. note:***,** and *
denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
166. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the spatial dimension of corporate tax competition in
Europe. The purpose was to investigate whether former EU-15 countries closer to the
EU new member states (NMS) experience more tax competition than those EU-countries
further away from the new member states. A simple theoretical model with footloose ¯rms
and transport costs demonstrate that a country's tax reaction function positively depends
on its proximity to low tax countries i.e. the further away from a low tax region, the higher
the tax premium a country can set. Using a spatial reaction function approach, we provide
empirical evidence of the ¯scal reaction functions between groups of countries in Europe.
Our analysis suggests that 'neighboring countries' of the new member states (Germany, Italy,
Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Greece) reacted much stronger to changes in the tax rates
of the new member states than 'non-neighboring countries' (France, Belgium, Netherlands,
UK, Spain and Portugal).
Surprisingly, the analysis suggests an asymmetric response whereby the EU-14 (Ireland is
excluded) 'neighbors' respond to taxes set by the new member states, i.e. German tax rates
respond to those set in Poland. But we fail to ¯nd evidence of a ¯scal reaction function of the
'neighbors' to tax rates set by the 'non-neighbors', i.e. Germany's taxes do not respond to
France's tax rates. In other words, tax competition in EU-countries seems predominantly
to come from countries located to the East not the West. Also, we do not ¯nd a ¯scal
reaction function for 'non-neighbors'. Their tax rates do not appear to be a®ected by the
NMS or the 'neighbors' of the NMS. These asymmetric results may explain why Ruiz and
Gerard (2007) ¯nd only weak evidence of tax mimicking behavior amongst EU-15 countries.
While our study leaves many issues unaddressed, if anything it suggests the existence of
asymmetric tax responses between EU countries.
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17Appendices
A. Map of EU-25
Figure A: Map of EU25
18B. Model derivations
B.1. Pro¯t maximization
The inverse demand functions in the model are derived from:
Q = M¡bP where for simplicity is assumed that b=1. ) PA = M¡QA and PB = M¡QB.
Using these inverse demand functions, the after-tax pro¯ts in country A and B are respec-
tively
¼A = [(M ¡ QA)QA + (m ¡ QAB)QAB ¡ cxQAB](1 ¡ tA) (16)
¼B = [(m ¡ QB)QB + (M ¡ QBA)QBA ¡ cx2QBA](1 ¡ tB)


































Calculate consumer surplus in country A when the MNE is located in A (CS1) and when






































4cx(2M2 + 2(m ¡ cx)2 ¡ 4M(4cxM + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxm)
4(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)2 (21)
=
cx(¡2M2 + 2(m ¡ cx)2 ¡ 5cxM + 10mM)
(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)2 > 0
B.3. Comparative statics




4cxM + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxm
2(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)
>
4cxm + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxM
2(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
(M2 ¡ m2)(7(M ¡ m) ¡ 4cx) + (M ¡ m)(2c2x2 ¡ 7mM) > 0











(4cM + 10c2x ¡ 10cm)(2M2 + 2(m ¡ cx)2 + 4c(m ¡ cx)(4cxM + 5c2x2 ¡ 10cxm)
4(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)2 (23)
=
2cM3 + (m ¡ cx)2c(2M + 5cx ¡ 5m) + c(m ¡ cx)(4cxM + (c2x2 ¡ 10cxm ¡ 5M2)
(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)2
C. Variable de¯nitions

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22D. First stage regression results
The following tables report the ¯rst stage results of the regression in column (1) of Table 1
and in column (1) of Table 2.
Table B: First stage regression of benchmark regression in Table 1, column (1)
WijTaxNMS;t
Wijpopulation > 14j;t 0.81**
(0.38)
Wijpopulation < 65j;t -3.57***
(0.69)
















Standard errors are in parentheses. note: ***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at resp.
1, 5 and 10 percent levels.




















Standard errors are in parentheses. note: ***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at resp.
1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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